Here are ALL of the files (except Ex_Summary_separate.tex – see below) in .zip format:
Example_Thesis.zip

If you can’t handle .zip then you’ll have to download the individual files below.

Here is the main file:
Example_Thesis.tex

Here is the title page and the pages called in the preamble:
Ex_thesis_titlepage.tex
Ex_Dedication.tex
Ex_Summary.tex
Ex_Preface.tex
Ex_Acknowledgments.tex

The title page requires these two image files:
cambridge_university_crest.jpg
cambridge_university_logo.jpg

Here are the pages called as the introduction and conclusion to the thesis:
Ex_thesis_introduction.tex
Ex_thesis_conclusion.tex

Here are your papers which are called up as component chapters of your thesis. These files will need to be filled with the TeX from your working papers without preamble (preamble etc. all goes into the main document Example_Thesis.tex):
Ex_Paper1.tex
Ex_Paper2.tex
Ex_Paper3.tex

Here is the bibliography style file I use, CamWP.bst. If you don’t like this format, you can easily change to another one by changing the file called by Example_Thesis.tex.
CamWP.bst

Finally, here is what the files should look like after you compile, but before you replace the filler material with your own material:
Example_Thesis.pdf

When you submit you’ll also have to hand in three separate copies of your thesis summary. These need to have your name and thesis title on. Here’s an independent TeX file for that (not included in the .zip above) which calls your summary into a file which includes a name and thesis title on top:
Ex_Summary_separate.tex

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of coalitional behaviour on public goods provision using a variety of static and evolutionary concepts of robustness to coalitional behaviour and concludes that the outcome depends crucially on whether the good in question is a strategic substitute or complement. When the good is a strategic substitute the effect of coalitional behaviour is non-existent or ambiguous. When the good is a strategic complement coalitional behaviour drives provision to Pareto superior levels. This does not depend on forward looking behaviour – myopic actions of coalitions also lead to long term welfare gains. This paper includes an application of stochastic stability arguments to a Markov process with an uncountable and unbounded state space. Read full paper.

Abstract

This paper gives sufficient conditions under which the stochastic
stability methods of Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993) and Ellison
(2000) can be uncomplicatedly applied to a process with an uncount-
able state space, corresponding to an evolutionary setting where play-
ers repeatedly play a game and choose from an uncountable set of
strategies. Examples are given to illustrate the problems which can
arise if any of the sufficient conditions is omitted. Read full paper.

Abstract

In this paper we define and discuss an equilibrium selection criterion which we call coalitional stochastic stability (CSS). This differs from existing work on stochastic stability in that profitable coalitional deviations are given greater importance than unprofitable single player deviations. CSS states are shown to exist and an intuitive and simple method is given for finding them. This method is shown to give a simple lexicographic ranking of efficiency and risk-dominance for 2×2 games. CSS is shown to select more plausible equilibria in games of contracting than standard uniform error models of stochastic stability, and provides a novel justification for interpretations of random errors as experimentation. We also discuss how one of the problems affecting stochastic stability methods – large expected time to convergence to stable states – can be mitigated using a coalitional approach. This paper is related to work on the noncooperative foundations of
cooperative game theory. Read full paper.

Abstract

This paper makes two contributions to the literature. Firstly, a learning dynamic is exhibited which ensures convergence to core allocations in a Nash demand game where the amount of good that can be produced by any set of players is given by a characteristic function. This is accomplished by the incorporation of joint strategic switching into the learning dynamic rather than, as in the previous literature, by assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors. Secondly, the stochastic stability properties of the model are examined when random errors are added, showing that, unlike previous analyses, a unique stochastically stable state can be obtained in the limit as the discretization of the strategy space becomes fine. Stochastically stable states are characterized and shown to solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem. Read the full paper.

Abstract

This paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna & Morgan (2001b) we analyze 2-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given: it is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders’ preferences relative to those of the receiver necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver and that they both have powers of editorial control. Finally, we show that there exist conditions under which all players can gain from the receiver being unaware of the presence of editorial control. Read the full paper.

Abstract

I provide an example relating to Proposition 10 of Galeotti et al. (2009), showing how degree independence is crucial for their result. Read the full paper.

The Burial of the Dead

• Cruelest Month (a blog about books)
• Memory and Desire (poetry, perfume, and the artistic imagination)
• He said, Marie, Marie, hold on tight (technology)
• The Hyacinth Girl (seems conservative and libertarian minded)
• Madame Sosostris (tarot)

A Game of Chess

• Rats’ Alley (?)
• That Shakespeherian Rag (Literature, newer site here)

The Fire Sermon

• Mr. Eugenides (conservatism & libertarianism)
• Weialala (Personal)

Death by Water

• Entering the Whirlpool (yours truly)
• Consider Phlebas (a political philosopher of some kind)

What the Thunder Said

• Maternal lamentations (motherhood)

I have fallen in love with American names,
The sharp names that never get fat,
The snakeskin-titles of mining-claims,
The plumed war-bonnet of Medicine Hat,
Tucson and Deadwood and Lost Mule Flat.

Seine and Piave are silver spoons,
But the spoonbowl-metal is thin and worn,
There are English counties like hunting-tunes
Played on the keys of a postboy’s horn,
But I will remember where I was born.

I will remember Carquinez Straits,
Little French Lick and Lundy’s Lane,
The Yankee ships and the Yankee dates
And the bullet-towns of Calamity Jane.
I will remember Skunktown Plain.

I will fall in love with a Salem tree
And a rawhide quirt from Santa Cruz,
I will get me a bottle of Boston sea
And a blue-gum nigger to sing me blues.
I am tired of loving a foreign muse.

Rue des Martyrs and Bleeding-Heart-Yard,
Senlis, Pisa, and Blindman’s Oast,
It is a magic ghost you guard
But I am sick for a newer ghost,
Harrisburg, Spartanburg, Painted Post.

Henry and John were never so
And Henry and John were always right?
Granted, but when it was time to go
And the tea and the laurels had stood all night,
Did they never watch for Nantucket Light?

I shall not rest quiet in Montparnasse.
I shall not lie easy at Winchelsea.
You may bury my body in Sussex grass,
You may bury my tongue at Champmédy.
I shall not be there. I shall rise and pass.
Bury my heart at Wounded Knee.

by Stephen Vincent Benét

h/t Jay Nordlinger